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Abstract
In this paper I assess the ‘Invariance Principle’, which states that only quantities
that are invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real. I argue,
contrary to current orthodoxy, that the variance of a quantity under a theory’s sym-
metries is not a sufficient basis for interpreting that theory as being uncommitted to
the reality of that quantity. Rather, I argue, the variance of a quantity under symme-
tries only ever serves as a motivation to refrain from any commitment to the quantity
in question. In the process of this discussion, I address the related but importantly
distinct issue of when symmetries can be said to prompt a mathematical reformulation
of the relevant theory.
1 Introduction
Take the Invariance Principle to be the principle that only quantities that are
invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real.1 It is a
doctrine with a distinguished pedigree: acclaimed theorists as diverse as the
physicist Paul Dirac, the mathematician Hermann Weyl, and the philosopher
Robert Nozick were all apparent signatories during their respective lifetimes.2
Prima facie, however, it is something of a mystery as to how and why the
principle is supposed to work. Nevertheless, there appear to be at least some
uncontroversial cases where it—or something very close to it—does work.
One such example can be found in Newtonian Gravitation Theory (NGT),
i.e., the theory comprising Newton’s three laws, plus his inverse square gravita-
tional law, governing the behaviour of point particles in Newtonian spacetime.
As is well known, this theory is Galilean invariant. This implies, among other
things, that if one takes any solution to NGT and “boosts” it—that is, uniformly
alters the absolute velocity of each point particle by the same amount through-
out its history—one will invariably get back a solution to NGT. Boosts, in other
words, are a symmetry of NGT: they are transformations that invariably map
solutions of the theory to solutions.
1I draw the term from Saunders (2007). Compare also Dasgupta’s (forthcoming)
“symmetry-to-reality inference”.
2See, e.g., Dirac (1930, vii), Weyl (1952, 132), and Nozick (2001, 82).
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Which quantity varies under this particular symmetry? The answer is obvi-
ous: absolute velocity. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we should
conclude that absolute velocity is not a genuine physical quantity. Conversely,
which quantities are invariant under this particular symmetry? Again, the an-
swer is obvious: relative (inter-particle) distance and velocity, temporal inter-
vals, and absolute acceleration. Thus, according to the Invariance Principle, we
should conclude that NGT’s boost symmetry does not threaten these quantities’
status as genuinely physical.
As it turns out, one can successfully purge Newtonian theory of the spacetime
structure required to make absolute velocity a physically meaningful quantity.
More specifically, one can move to Galilean spacetime. (Sometimes also called
“Neo-Newtonian spacetime”.)3 Here, the Newtonian posit of persisting points
of absolute space—persisting points which, crucially, allow for the notion of ab-
solute velocity to be physically meaningful—is done away with, but an affine
structure is nevertheless preserved, which defines the “straight” or force-free (in-
ertial) paths through spacetime. Absolute velocity is therefore not a physically
meaningful quantity in Galilean spacetime, as it is in Newtonian spacetime.
Nevertheless, all other Newtonian notions, including the notion of absolute ac-
celeration, remain well-defined in Galilean spacetime. To the extent that one
opts for Galilean over Newtonian spacetime, then, one has excised an ostensibly
odious piece of theoretical structure from NGT.
Three important caveats are worth noting, however. First, and most obvi-
ously, none of this is to say that Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime
is therefore the true and complete theory of the world. (It isn’t.) Second, nor
is this to say that by moving to Galilean spacetime one has thereby purged
Newtonian theory of all its “variant” structure. (One hasn’t. The symmetry
group of Newtonian theory is actually wider than the Galilean group: it has
additional symmetries.)4 Third, nor is this even to say that the invariant quan-
tities one ends up with following such an application of the Invariance Principle
will invariably be preserved in future theories. (For instance, there is no notion
of “relative spatial distance” simpliciter in special relativity.) Given all of these
caveats, however, one might well ask: What good is the Invariance Principle,
exactly? What purpose, in particular, does it serve?
As I see it—and, I take it, as many other contemporary theorists also see
it—the purpose of the Invariance Principle is essentially comparative. That is, it
is simply supposed to lead you to a better theory—or a better interpretation, or
characterisation, of the same theory—than the one you started with. To take the
case at hand: Newtonian theory set in Galilean spacetime is a better theory than
Newtonian theory set in Newtonian spacetime. It is a theory which possesses
all of the theoretical virtues of its rival, but lacks any apparent ontological
commitment to the unwanted variant quantity in question.
In summary, the Galilean invariance of NGT, in conjunction with the In-
variance Principle, is supposed to indicate that neither absolute velocity nor
3See, e.g., Earman (1989, §2.4).
4See, e.g., Knox (2014). I discuss this point further in Section 4 below.
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any corresponding persisting points of absolute space are genuinely real. Now
to lay my cards on the table: I actually think that something very close to
this general kind of inference—that is, from the variance of a quantity under
symmetries to that quantity’s nonreality—is legitimate. The devil, however, is
in the details. In particular, I don’t believe that the mere Galilean invariance
of NGT is enough to establish absolute velocity’s nonreality. And in general, I
don’t believe that the mere variance of a quantity under symmetries is enough to
establish that quantity’s nonreality. These beliefs, as far as I can determine, put
me in the minority camp in the contemporary philosophical literature on sym-
metries. Nevertheless, I think they are correct beliefs—and they are precisely
the ones that I will attempt to argue for in the remainder of this paper.
2 Interpretational vs Motivational
In arguing for the above claims, it will prove extremely useful first to distinguish
between two very different ways of thinking about symmetries.
Close cousins of the distinction that I have in mind have already been drawn
in the literature. Thus, Greaves and Wallace write:
There is a widespread consensus that two states of affairs related
by a symmetry transformation are really just the same state of affairs
differently described. That is, if two mathematical models of a physical
theory are related by a symmetry transformation, then those models
represent one and the same physical state of affairs. (Greaves and
Wallace 2014, 60)
They continue:
Although we agree with this consensus [...] even those who do not
agree that symmetry-related states of affairs are identical at least
agree that they are empirically indistinguishable from one another.
(Greaves and Wallace 2014, 60, fn 1)
To illustrate the difference between these two ways of thinking about symme-
tries, consider again the example of boosts in NGT. According to the “widespread
consensus” view alluded to, and endorsed by, Greaves and Wallace, boosted
models of NGT are to be taken to represent the same physical state of affairs
even when the theory is putatively set in Newtonian spacetime. In other words,
according to this view, one needn’t make the move to Galilean spacetime in or-
der not to be committed to absolute velocities; there is a way of understanding
boosted models’ physical equivalence, and their associated noncommitment to
the notion of absolute velocity, prior to making this move.5
Things are very different according to the second conception of symme-
tries described, and rejected, by Greaves and Wallace. According to this view,
boosted models of NGT are to be regarded as physically inequivalent: they are
not to be construed as representing the same physical state of affairs. Instead,
5See, e.g., Healey (2007, 114-7), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
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such models are taken to represent physically distinct scenarios, which differ in
what absolute velocity they ascribe to the world’s total material content. Never-
theless, such models still represent empirically indistinguishable states of affairs:
in a Newtonian universe, no experiment could ever help an observer determine
what her absolute velocity actually is. Such boosted models therefore represent
physically distinct ways for the world to be, albeit ones that are indiscernible
on the basis of measurement.6
As previously mentioned, this distinction between different ways of thinking
about symmetries is close, but not identical, to the one that I want to draw.
The key reason why it is not identical is because Greaves and Wallace say
nothing to the effect that the person who subscribes to the second conception
of symmetries—that is, who believes that symmetry-related models invariably
represent empirically indistinguishable, but not necessarily physically equiva-
lent, states of affairs—should still be motivated to seek an alternative theory, or
an alternative interpretation or characterisation of the same theory, according
to which such models do not merely represent empirically indistinguishable sce-
narios, but rather represent physically equivalent states of affairs.7 Moreover, I
claim, it is precisely this notion of motivation which plays a central role in cor-
rectly understanding the philosophical significance of symmetries in the general
case.8
Here, then, is what I take to be the appropriate distinction between these
two different ways of thinking about symmetries:
• Interpretational: Symmetries allow us to interpret theories as being com-
mitted solely to the existence of invariant quantities, even in the absence
of a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is
alleged to underlie symmetry-related models.
• Motivational: Symmetries only motivate us to find a metaphysically
perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
symmetry-related models, but they do not allow us to interpret that theory
as being solely committed to the existence of invariant quantities in the
absence of any such characterisation.
The central claim of this paper may now be neatly summarised: the (orthodox)
interpretational view is mistaken; the (unorthodox) motivational view is correct.
Drawing the distinction in the way that I have done, however, invites the
rather obvious question: What, precisely, is meant by a “metaphysically per-
spicuous characterisation” of reality? This is the question addressed in the next
section.
6See, e.g., Maudlin (1993, 192), for an endorsement of this view in the Newtonian context.
7Compare (again) Maudlin’s (1993, 192) discussion in the Newtonian context.
8Note that I do not intend any of this as a criticism of Greaves and Wallace’s paper.
Indeed, as Greaves and Wallace (2014, 60, fn 1) are careful to remark, the distinction they
draw is orthogonal to the central topic of their paper, namely the issue of which symmetries
have “direct empirical significance” (i.e., have analogues to Galileo’s ship).
4
3 More on Metaphysical Perspicuity
In intuitive terms, a metaphysically perspicuous characterisation of reality is one
which corresponds to, or “limns”, reality’s structure in some suitably faithful
way. To use another common (Platonic) metaphor, a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of reality is one which “carves nature at its joints”. (In
comparative terms: a description of reality is more metaphysically perspicuous
than another precisely to the extent that it corresponds to, or limns, reality’s
structure more faithfully than its rival does.)
As many readers will be aware, such a notion is frequently alluded to, and
made use of, in contemporary analytic metaphysics.9 But metaphysical per-
spicuity is also, I think, a notion that is reasonably serviceable in physical (rather
than “merely metaphysical”) contexts. One particularly illustrative example—
albeit a slightly misleading one, for reasons that I will soon explain—drawn
from physics may plausibly be found in classical electromagnetism.10 As is well
known, this theory may be formulated in two different ways.11 According to
one such formulation, EM1, the theory is expressed in terms of the Faraday
tensor, Fab, satisfying the (Maxwell) equations ∇[aFbc] = 0 and ∇aF ab = Ja,
where Ja is a vector field representing the charge current density. According to
the second formulation, EM2, however, the theory is expressed in terms of the
vector potential, Aa, satisfying the equation ∇a∇aAb −∇b∇aAa = Jb.
These two formulations of electromagnetism are related to one another.
In particular, any model 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 of EM2 corresponds to a unique model
〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, via the equation Fab = ∇[aAb]. The converse, however,
is not true. That is, a typical model of EM1 does not typically correspond to
a unique model of EM2. More specifically, if 〈M,ηab, Aa〉 is a model of EM2
corresponding to a model 〈M,ηab, Fab〉 of EM1, then so will any other model of
EM2 〈M,ηab, A′a〉, where A′a is related to Aa by a “gauge transformation” A′a
= Aa + ∇aχ, where χ is some smooth scalar field.
It is EM1 which, I take it, constitutes the metaphysically perspicuous charac-
terisation of this theory. That is, it is the tensor Fab which faithfully represents
the fundamental ontology of the theory, namely the electromagnetic field. Not so
EM2. This second formulation may, of course, be useful for various calculational
or heuristic purposes. But the key point is that the vector potential Aa does not
directly represent a genuinely real field: rather, it is merely a mathematically
convenient “shorthand” way of characterising and determining the values of the
Faraday tensor, which is taken to represent the genuine material ontology of
the theory.12 Moreover, it is precisely by construing the vector potential in this
9See, e.g., O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens (1995, 154-7).
10Here and below, I take this theory to be set in Minkowski spacetime. Thus, the spacetime
models of this theory are of the form 〈M,ηab〉, where M is a four-dimensional differentiable
manifold, and ηab is the Minkowski metric.
11For a recent, intriguing study of the relationship between these two different formulations
of electromagnetism, see Weatherall (forthcoming). I draw heavily on his discussion over the
next couple of paragraphs.
12Modulo, that is, certain concerns that arise as a result of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. See,
e.g., Healey (2007).
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way which plausibly allows us to explain and understand, in a fully transpar-
ent way, gauge-symmetry models’ physical equivalence in EM2—namely, for the
reason that they are merely notationally distinct ways of representing the same
fundamental physical ontology.
As mentioned above, I think this example of metaphysical perspicuity is apt
to be slightly misleading, at least when taken on its own. This is because this
example might make it seem as though having a metaphysically perspicuous
characterisation of the (putative) reality underlying symmetry-related models
crucially relies upon one having to mathematically reformulate the relevant the-
ory (or at least upon having such a mathematical reformulation already in hand),
and in particular upon having to reformulate the theory so as to remove any
relevant representational redundancy. However, I think this is incorrect. That
is, I believe that one can, in fact, be in possession of a metaphysically perspicu-
ous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even in
the absence of any mathematical (re-)formulation of the theory which removes
the relevant representational redundancy.
Let me illustrate this point with two simple examples. First, consider the
case of shift symmetry in NGT. This symmetry is subtly different from the case
of boost symmetry, discussed above. Here, instead of uniformly altering the
absolute velocity of each particle throughout its history, one enacts a global,
time-independent repositioning of all matter in space. Thus, for instance, in the
shifted world all of the world’s material content will (prima facie) be located
three metres to the left of where it is in the original world. The basic idea
behind the “Leibniz shift” argument—the famous argument associated with
this symmetry—is that the substantivalist’s admission of points of space as
primitive objects (allegedly) has the undesirable consequence of committing her
to regarding shifted worlds as physically distinct, yet nevertheless empirically
indistinguishable:13 in intuitive terms, everything would look, feel, taste, touch
and sound the same in the two (putatively distinct) shifted worlds, just as in
the case of boosted worlds.
It will prove helpful to express all of this in terms of the models of the theory.
Thus, take a generic model of NGT to be of the formM = 〈M, tab, hab, σa, ρ, φ〉,
where M is a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, tab is the temporal metric,
hab is the spatial metric, σa is the timelike vector field whose integral curves rep-
resent the persisting points of absolute space, and ρ and φ represent the matter
density and the gravitational potential field respectively.14 A shift symmetry
can then be characterised as the application of the appropriate diffeomorphism
(corresponding to a spatial translation) d so as to yield a new modelMstatic =
〈M, tab, hab, σa, d∗ρ, d∗φ〉. It is then alleged thatM andMstatic differ precisely
13Though see Maudlin (1993), who notes that there is an interesting (epistemological) sense
in which shifted worlds in NGT are not indiscernible after all.
14Note that the canonical presentations of Newtonian spacetime (e.g., Earman 1989, §2.5)
take the affine connection as ideologically primitive. I find such presentations unsatisfactory for
historical rather than for philosophical reasons: in particular, it threatens to make the move
to Galilean spacetime seem almost trivial, and the associated timelike vector field trivially
superfluous. For more on this point, see Pooley (MS, §4.4-§4.5).
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insofar as they each represent the world’s matter content as being located at
distinct places in absolute space. More specifically, such Leibniz-shifted scenar-
ios are alleged to differ precisely with regard to which particular points of space
are underlying various parts of the matter fields.
For a second example, consider diffeomorphism symmetry in general relativ-
ity (GR). Here, similarly, the existence of this symmetry is alleged to commit
the substantivalist to a plurality of physically distinct possibilities that are nev-
ertheless empirically indistinguishable. In terms of the models of the theory:
taking a generic model of GR to be of the formM = 〈M, gab, Tab〉 and applying
an arbitrary diffeomorphism d to yield a new modelMdiff = 〈M,d∗gab, d∗Tab〉
(where M is again a differentiable 4-dimensional manifold, gab is the metric
tensor, and Tab is the stress-energy tensor which, roughly speaking, represents
the model’s matter content), the two scenarios represented are alleged to differ
with regard to which particular points of the spacetime manifold are underlying
various parts of the metric and matter fields.15
It is my contention that neither the shift symmetry of NGT, nor the diffeo-
morphism symmetry of general relativity, by themselves motivate any mathe-
matical reconstrual of the respective theories. This is because I believe there
is a perfectly transparent, anti-haecceitist, “modestly structuralist”—but nev-
ertheless fully substantivalist—way of understanding such models’ representa-
tional equivalence even in the absence of any such mathematical reformulation.
On this view, spacetime points are construed as genuinely real, fundamental
entities. However, they are “contextually individuated”: they are not to be
understood as being anything more—or less—than “nodes” in the relational,
geometrical structures in which they are embedded. Shifted models in NGT
and diffeomorphically-related models in GR are thus to be understood as rep-
resenting the same physical state of affairs precisely because the exact same
pattern of relational, geometrical structures is represented as obtaining in each
case. Moreover, this view denies that there are any primitive, singular (“haec-
ceitistic”) facts about spacetime points which would even allow for a distinction
between shifted or diffeomorphically-related scenarios to be coherently drawn.16
Whence the difference, then, between the case of gauge symmetry in electro-
magnetism on the one hand, and shift and diffeomorphism symmetry in NGT
and GR on the other? I think the answer is straightforward. In the latter cases,
the models in question are isomorphic: they represent worlds which differ at
most with regard to which particular objects are playing which qualitative roles,
i.e., they represent at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. Hence,
adopting modest structuralism (which implies anti-haecceitism) about space-
time transparently collapses the number of possibilities represented by these
models to one. In the former such case, however, the relevant models are not
isomorphic—read “literally”, gauge-related models of EM2 assign qualitatively
distinct arrangements of the vector field over spacetime—hence adopting a mod-
estly structuralist ontology does not by itself collapse the number of represented
15For further details see, e.g., Earman (1989, §9).
16For further defence of this view—which is sometimes also called sophisticated substanti-
valism in the literature—see, e.g., Saunders (2003), Ladyman (2007), and Pooley (2013).
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possibilities to one. In order to transparently understand such models’ physical
equivalence, then, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
To summarise the claims made thus far: according to the motivational view
of symmetries, one is invariably only motivated to regard symmetry-related
models as physically equivalent; moreover, one is justified in regarding such
models as physically equivalent only insofar as one is in possession of a meta-
physically perspicuous characterisation of the reality which is alleged to underlie
them. However, it is possible to be in possession of a metaphysically perspic-
uous characterisation of the reality underlying symmetry-related models even
in the absence of a mathematical formulation of the theory which removes the
relevant representational redundancy. Such a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation is possible just in case the symmetry-related models in question are
isomorphic, or are naturally understood as representing at most haecceitistically
distinct possibilities. In brief: symmetry-related, isomorphic models invariably
do not motivate a mathematical reformulation of the relevant theory (modest
structuralism invariably suffices); but symmetry-related, non-isomorphic models
invariably do.17
4 In Defence of the Motivational View
Let us return once more to the case of NGT. As alluded to in Section 1, the
symmetry group of this theory is quite large. For not only does it include trans-
formations corresponding to global velocity boosts of solutions’ matter content,
but it also includes transformations corresponding to time-dependent transla-
tional accelerations of such content (so long as the gravitational potential field
is also appropriately transformed). Thus, read “literally”, the symmetries of
this theory include transformations that map solutions to solutions that repre-
sent physically distinct, but nevertheless empirically indistinguishable, states of
affairs in which a given material system is:
1. Force-free and stationary with respect to absolute space.
2. Force-free and moving at constant absolute velocity.
3. Absolutely accelerating under a gravitational force-field.
According to the interpretational conception of symmetries, we may legit-
imately take all of these symmetry-related solutions to in fact represent the
same physical state of affairs—despite the fact that they are naturally under-
stood as representing radically distinct physical situations. Things are very
different, however, according to the motivational conception of symmetries. On
this view, we are merely motivated to regard all such solutions as representing
the same physical state of affairs, the motivation arising from the general Oc-
camist principle that, other things being equal, our preferred scientific theories
should not allow for solutions that represent physically distinct but nevertheless
empirically indistinguishable possible worlds. According to the motivational
17See also Pooley (2013, 576-7) and Weatherall (forthcoming) for recent, related arguments
to this effect.
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view, then (and to repeat slightly), absent a metaphysically perspicuous char-
acterisation of the reality underlying these symmetry-related models, we have
no choice but to regard them as representing physically distinct states of affairs.
For our purposes, the crucial thing to note about all of these models is
that none of them are isomorphic—naturally understood, they do not represent
at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds. According to the criterion
laid down in the previous section, then, in order to be able to transparently
understand how it could be that such models may be said to represent physically
equivalent scenarios, a mathematical reformulation of the theory is required.
As it turns out, such a mathematical reformulation of the theory is pos-
sible. In brief, in this reformulation one replaces the vector field σa with a
new kind of dynamical inertial connection ∇NC , with models of the formMNC
= 〈M, tab, hab,∇NC , ρ〉. Up to isomorphism, any two symmetry-related mod-
els of NGT correspond to a unique model of Newtonian gravity geometrised
in this way. Thus, it is said, by moving to this “Newton-Cartan” theory one
successfully removes the undesirable “gauge-redundancy” inherent in all non-
geometrised versions of Newtonian gravitation theory.18
What might the defender of the interpretational view of symmetries say in
defence of her view—in this context, that the move to Newton-Cartan theory
is not required in order to be able to legitimately regard all symmetry-related
solutions of NGT as physically equivalent?
I anticipate two likely lines of response. First, she might attempt to establish
the preferability of her view over the motivational view by noting that the
defender of the motivational view is committed, at least prior to the appropriate
theory’s reformulation (in the context of NGT), to the existence of in principle
undetectable (symmetry-variant) matters of fact. Moreover, the defender of
the interpretational view might argue, this is an unpalatable consequence, one
which we would do best to avoid—and one which, she might point out, the
interpretational view does in fact avoid.
I agree that the admission of such in principle undetectable facts is an un-
desirable consequence of the motivational view. However, I do not think that
this admission is sufficiently unpalatable so as to be capable of refuting the
motivational view, or even of establishing the preferability of the interpreta-
tional view over the motivational view. After all, prohibitively strong versions
of verificationism aside, there is nothing obviously absurd about admitting in
principle undetectable facts into one’s ontology; nor is there any obvious reason
why we should always be capable of discovering a theory, or a perspicuous char-
acterisation thereof (the case of isomorphic models excepted), which succeeds
in transparently explaining such solutions’ empirical equivalence by virtue of
18For further details, see, e.g., Knox (2014). Note also the important point that moving
to Newton-Cartan theory is not by itself sufficient for one to be able to transparently under-
stand as physically equivalent all symmetry-related models of Newtonian theory set in flat
spacetime. This is because—as mentioned above—such symmetry-related models will typi-
cally correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan theory only up to isomorphism. Thus,
in order to have a fully transparent understanding of how it is that symmetry-related models
of Newtonian theory set in flat spacetime can correspond to a single model of Newton-Cartan
theory, a modestly structuralist conception of spacetime ontology is also required.
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their actual physical equivalence; nor indeed is there even any obvious way of
guaranteeing that there will always be such a theory or characterisation (again,
isomorphic models excepted) waiting in logical space to be discovered.
Furthermore, although it is to be admitted that the Newtonian who sub-
scribes to the merely motivational view of symmetries might indeed be com-
mitted to the possibility of there being facts beyond her epistemic grasp, it
nevertheless bears emphasising that for such a Newtonian there is a perfectly
good explanation as to why such facts are epistemically inaccessible: they are in-
accessible precisely because the world is in fact accurately described by the laws
of NGT, with associated models of the form 〈M, tab, hab, σa, ρ, φ〉, and because
all any Newtonian observer ultimately has empirical access to are the relative
distances and velocities between material entities. For such a Newtonian, then,
the empirical phenomena underdetermine the genuine physical facts; but the
theory itself is able to provide a perfectly transparent explanation of the re-
ality behind the phenomena in terms of which the underdetermination can be
straightforwardly understood.
The Newtonian who adopts the interpretational construal of symmetries,
however, would appear to lose this explanatory transparency. In other words,
she might know that she may legitimately regard all symmetry-related solutions
as physically equivalent; but the reality in terms of which this physical equiv-
alence is to be understood will (absent a reformulation of the theory) remain
opaque to her; she is offered no immediate explanation as to how such physical
equivalence is to be construed, or how it could even be said to arise.
These considerations naturally suggest a second possible line of response for
the defender of the interpretational view. In particular, she might claim that
she does, in fact, have a transparent understanding of the reality underlying
NGT’s symmetry-related models, and that such a transparent understanding is
in fact attainable prior to the move to Newton-Cartan theory.19
Such a response evidently leads into deep philosophical waters very quickly.
(After all, what does it mean to be in possession of a “transparent under-
standing” of anything?) But let me make a brief remark as to why I find this
particular claim to be implausible. For note that in NGT the persisting points
of absolute space are not merely “idly turning wheels” that can simply be ex-
punged from the theory without explanatory loss: they are not “explanatorily
idle” posits. This is for two main reasons. First, such points play a crucial
role in the metaphysical explanation of what quantities like relative velocity and
absolute rotation and absolute acceleration truly are: for the Newtonian, facts
about particular inter-particle velocities and absolute rotations and absolute ac-
celerations are naturally understood as being grounded in particular facts about
(rates of change of) absolute velocities.20 Second, such points provide the cru-
cial transtemporal standard which is required in the realist’s causal explanation
of the observable effects of noninertial motion (e.g., Newton’s famous “bucket
experiment”): a standard without which Newton’s laws simply cannot be formu-
19Dewar (2015, esp. 322)—who is a recent, explicit defender of the interpretational view—is
plausibly read as making this claim.
20Cf. Pooley (MS, 118).
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lated (at least, absent any other way of construing the transtemporal structure
required to underwrite the distinction between inertial and noninertial motion).
In short—and to the extent that the interpretational view is not supposed to
reduce to a rather uninteresting form of scientific instrumentalism—it is simply
not clear what causal-explanatory, realistic picture of the world is being pro-
pounded by the defender of the interpretational view, at least in this particular
(Newtonian) context; it is simply opaque what, according to her, the world is
really like.
Acknowledgements
For extremely helpful comments and discussion, I would like to thank Neil De-
war, James Ladyman, Niels Martens, Tushar Menon, Oliver Pooley, James
Read, Simon Saunders, Alex Skinner, Teru Thomas, David Wallace, and au-
diences in London and Cardiff.
References
Dasgupta, S. (forthcoming), “Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice
Over).” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Dewar, N. (2015), “Symmetries and the Philosophy of Language.” Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Modern Science, Vol. 52, pp. 317-327.
Dirac, P. A. M. (1930), The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford
University Press. (Reference is made to 1958 (4th) edition.)
Earman, J. (1989), World-Enough and Space-Time. MIT Press.
Greaves, H. and Wallace, D. (2014), “Empirical Consequences of Symme-
tries.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 59-89.
Healey, R. (2007), Gauging What’s Real. Oxford University Press.
Knox, E. (2014), “Newtonian Spacetime Structure In Light of the Equiva-
lence Principle.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 65, No. 4,
pp. 863-880.
Ladyman, J. (2007), “Scientific Structuralism: On the Identity and Diversity
of Objects in a Structure.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 81,
No. 1, pp. 23-43.
Maudlin, T. (1993), “Buckets of Water and Waves of Space: Why Spacetime
Is Probably a Substance.” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 183-203.
Nozick, R. (2001), Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World. Har-
vard University Press.
O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. and Cortens, A. (1995), “Towards Ontological Ni-
hilism.” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 143-165.
Pooley, O. (2013), “Substantivalist and Relationalist Approaches to Space-
time.” In R. Batterman (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics. Ox-
ford University Press.
Pooley, O. (MS), The Reality of Spacetime. Book manuscript.
11
Saunders, S. (2003), “Physics and Leibniz’s Principles.” In K. Brading & E.
Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Cambridge
University Press.
Saunders, S. (2007), “Mirroring as an A Priori Symmetry.” Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 452-480.
Weatherall, J. (forthcoming). “Understanding Gauge.” Philosophy of Sci-
ence.
Weyl, H. (1952), Symmetry. Princeton University Press.
12
